Nonlinear pricing and taxation complicate economic decisions by creating multiple marginal prices for the same good. This paper provides a framework to uncover consumers' perceived price of nonlinear price schedules. I exploit price variation at spatial discontinuities in electricity service areas, where households in the same city experience substantially di↵erent nonlinear pricing. Using household-level panel data from administrative records, I find strong evidence that consumers respond to average price rather than marginal or expected marginal price. This sub-optimizing behavior makes nonlinear pricing unsuccessful in achieving its policy goal of energy conservation and critically changes the welfare implications of nonlinear pricing.
Introduction
A central assumption in economics is that firms and consumers optimize with marginal price.
For example, consider taxpayers faced with a nonlinear income tax schedule. The theory of optimal taxation assumes that taxpayers respond to their marginal tax rate by making a right connection between their income and nonlinear tax system (Mirrlees 1971 , Atkinson and Stiglitz 1976 , and Diamond 1998 . Likewise, empirical studies in economics generally take this assumption as given when estimating key parameters in a variety of markets that involve nonlinear price, subsidy, and tax schedules. However, evidence from many recent studies suggests that consumers may not respond to nonlinear pricing as the standard theory predicts. Many surveys find that few people understand the marginal rate of nonlinear price, subsidy, and tax schedules. In this paper, I provide a framework to uncover consumers' perceived price of nonlinear price schedules. Economic theory provides at least three possibilities about the perceived price. The standard model of nonlinear budget sets predicts that consumers respond to marginal price. However, in the presence of uncertainty about consumption, rational consumers respond to expected marginal price (Saez 1999; Borenstein 2009 ). Alternatively, 1 For example, the market for cellular phone (Huang 2008) , energy (Reiss and White 2005) , labor (Hausman 1985) , and water (Olmstead, Michael Hanemann, and Stavins 2007) .
2 See Liebman (1998) and Fujii and Hawley (1988) on tax rates, Brown, Ho↵man, and Baxter (1975) on electricity price, and Carter and Milon (2005) on water price.
3 For example, see de Bartolome (1995) for evidence from laboratory experiments.
consumers may use average price as an approximation of marginal price if the cognitive cost of understanding complex pricing is substantial. This sub-optimization is described as "schmeduling" by Liebman and Zeckhauser (2004) .
My analysis exploits price variation at spatial discontinuities in California electricity service areas. Because the territory border of two power companies lies within city limits, households in the same city experience significantly di↵erent nonlinear pricing. This research design addresses the long-discussed identification problems in the literature (Heckman 1996; Blundell, Duncan, and Meghir 1998; Goolsbee 2000; Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz 2012) by having nearly identical groups of households experiencing di↵erent price variation.
The access to the full administrative data on electricity billing records allow me to construct household-level monthly panel data for essentially all households in the study area from 1999 to 2007. The sample period provides substantial cross-sectional and time-series price variation because the two companies changed their price multiple times independently.
The billing data include customers' nine-digit zip code, with which I match census data to
show that demographic and housing characteristics are balanced across the territory border of the two power companies.
Results from my three empirical strategies provide strong evidence that consumers respond to average price rather than marginal or expected marginal price. First, I examine whether there is bunching of consumers at the kink points of nonlinear price schedules. Such bunching must be observed if consumers respond to marginal price (Heckman 1983; Saez 2010; Chetty et al. 2011) . I find no bunching anywhere in the consumption distribution despite the fact that the marginal price discontinuously increases by more than 80% at some kink points. The absence of bunching implies either that 1) consumers respond to marginal price with zero elasticity or 2) they respond to alternative price. To explore this point, I
use the encompassing test (Davidson and MacKinnon 1993) to examine whether consumers respond to marginal, expected marginal, or average price. I find that average price has a significant e↵ect on consumption, while the e↵ects of marginal price and expected marginal price become statistically insignificant from zero once I control for the e↵ect of average price in the regression. Finally, I propose a strategy that estimates the shape of the perceived price directly. My model nests a wide range of potential shapes of perceived price by allowing consumers put di↵erent weights on each part of their nonlinear price schedule. Then, I empirically estimate the weights, from which I can recover the shape of their perceived price. I find that the shape of the resulting perceived price is nearly identical to the shape of average price.
This sub-optimizing behavior changes the policy implications of nonlinear pricing. First, I show that the sub-optimal response makes nonlinear pricing unsuccessful in achieving its policy goal of energy conservation. Many electric, natural gas, and water utilities in the US adopted nonlinear pricing similar to California's residential electricity pricing. 4 Policy makers often claim that higher marginal prices for excessive consumption can create an incentive for conservation. Contrary to the policy objective, I show that nonlinear tari↵s may result in a slight increase in aggregate consumption compared with an alternative flat marginal rate if consumers respond to average price. Second, the sub-optimal response changes the e ciency cost of nonlinear pricing. I show that it reduces the e ciency cost given a reasonable range of assumptions on the private marginal cost of electricity. However, it increases the e ciency cost when the social marginal cost of electricity is substantially high because of negative environmental externalities from electricity generation.
The findings also have important implications for US climate change legislation. In the cap-and-trade program proposed in the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, about 30% of emission permits would be given to electric utilities for free. The proposal explicitly prohibits distributing the value of the free allowance based on each customer's electricity consumption. Instead, it recommends providing a fixed credit on electricity bills.
The rationale behind the policy is to preserve the marginal incentive to conserve electricity. However, if customers respond to average price, the fixed credit to electricity bills still discourages conservation and increase electricity consumption and the compensation scheme needs to be reconsidered.
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Although the possibility of this sub-optimizing behavior has been long discussed in public finance, industrial organization, and environmental economics, previous studies provide inconclusive results because of several empirical challenges. 6 First, the access to extensive individual-level data is rarely available to researchers. Second, Heckman (1996) note that usual non-experimental data do not provide a clean control group because all comparable individuals usually face exactly the same nonlinear price schedule. Third, many studies do not have su cient exogenous price variation to statistically distinguish the e↵ects of alternative forms of price. My analysis addresses the challenges by exploiting substantial cross-sectional and time-series price variation at the spatial discontinuity of electricity service areas and provides robust empirical findings.
My findings are consistent with those in the literature that studies consumer inattention 5 Use of allowances is described on page 901 of Congress (2009) . Burtraw (2009) and Burtraw, Walls, and Blonz (2010) note that distributing a fixed credit may not work in the desired way if residential customers do not pay attention to the di↵erence between their marginal price of electricity and their electricity bill.
6 For example, Shin (1985) ; Liebman and Zeckhauser (2004); Feldman and Katuscak (2006); Borenstein (2009). to complex pricing.
7 While many studies test the hypothesis that consumers misperceive complex prices, the actual shape of perceived price is not explicitly examined and remains unknown in most studies. My empirical strategy provides a way to nest a wide range of potential shapes of perceived price, from which researchers can estimate the true shape of perceived price by examining consumer behavior in response to price variation.
Theoretical Predictions
Economic theory provides three di↵erent predictions about consumers' perceived price of nonlinear price schedules. To characterize the predictions, consider a price schedule p(x)
in Figure 1 . The marginal price of x equals p 1 for x AE k and p 2 for x > k. This form of nonlinear pricing is widely used in many economic policies. The standard model of nonlinear budget sets predicts that consumers optimize x based on the true marginal price schedule p(x). That is, the perceived price is identical to p(x).
This response requires two implicit assumptions: 1) consumers have no uncertainty about x and 2) they fully understand the structure of the nonlinear price schedule. Saez (1999) and Borenstein (2009) Gabaix and Laibson (2006) ; Hossain and Morgan (2006) ; Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009); Finkelstein (2009) ; Brown, Hossain, and Morgan (2010) ; Gabaix (2011); Malmendier and Lee (2011); Chetty (2012) .
and Zeckhauser (2004) relax the second assumption by allowing inattention to complex price schedules. In the inattention model, consumers respond to the average price of their total payment as an approximation of marginal price if the cognitive cost of understanding complex pricing is substantial. In practice, the information required to calculate average price is substantially less than marginal price. Total payment and quantity are su cient information and the knowledge of the nonlinearity of the price schedule is not necessary.
I consider a general form of perceived price that encompasses all of the three theoretical predictions. Suppose that consumers care about p(x + ') for a range of ' because they consider uncertainty about x or they have inattention to the price schedule. They construct the perceived pricep(x) by deciding relative weights w(') on p(x + '): Empirically, there are two ways to uncoverp(x). The first approach is to assume a certain shape of w(x) based on economic theory and test if it is consistent with data. The second approach is to directly estimate w(') to findp(x). I use both approaches. Regardless of which approach I use, there are two empirical challenges to identifyp(x). First, it requires su cient exogenous price variation to distinguish competing predictions about the shape of p(x). Second, it requires a well-identified control group to distinguish the e↵ect of price from other factors that also a↵ect consumption. The next section describes how I address the two challenges by exploiting spatial discontinuities in California electricity service areas.
Research Design and Data
This section describes two key features of my research design. First, households in the same city experience di↵erent nonlinear pricing because the territory border of two power companies lies within the city limits. Second, they experience substantially di↵erent price variation because the power companies change the price schedules independently. This border contrasts with typical territory borders of utility companies, which correspond to city, county, or state boundaries. Why is the border in the city limits? In the 1940's, SCE and SDG&E connected their transmission lines in this area and established the territory border (Crawford 1991; Myers 1983) . The border does not correspond to the city limits because the city limits in this area were established around the 1980's. Lee and Lemieux (2010) note that geographical discontinuity designs (Black, 1999) area. It is nearly impossible for households to sort based on their expected electricity bill because the relative electricity price between SCE and SDG&E changes frequently; the price is higher in SCE in some years while it is higher in SDG&E in other years as presented in the next section. Third, the next section shows that demographic and housing characteristics are balanced across the territory border, suggesting that the systematic sorting is unlikely to have occurred. Finally, it would be a concern if households receive natural gas, a substitute for electricity, from di↵erent providers. This is not the case in this area because all households are served by the same natural gas provider, Southern California Gas Company. price is a step function of monthly consumption relative to a "baseline" consumption level.
Nonlinear Electricity Pricing and Price Variation
The baseline di↵ers by climate regions in the utility territories. However, because households in this study are in the same climate regions, the baseline is essentially the same for everyone.
The baseline is about 10 kWh/day with a slight di↵erence between summer and winter billing months.
8 Figure 4 shows that the cross-sectional price variation between SCE and SDG&E also changes over time quite substantially. Until the summer of 2000, SCE and SDG&E had nearly the same two-tier nonlinear price schedules. The first price shock occurred during the California electricity crisis in the summer of 2000. 9 The rates for SDG&E customers started to increase in May in response to increases in wholesale electricity prices. In August, the first and second tier rates increased to 22¢ and 25¢ per kWh. This increase translated into a 100% rate increase for SDG&E customers relative to their rates in 1999. In contrast, the rates for SCE customers stayed at 1999 levels because their retail prices were protected from changes in wholesale price during this period. The second price shock happened in 2001, when SCE introduced a five-tier price schedule in June and SDG&E followed four months later, although their rates were di↵erent. Afterwards, they changed the five-tier rates di↵erently over time.
How are the rates determined and why are they di↵erent between SCE and SDG&E? Retail electricity price in California is regulated by the California Public Utility Commission.
When regulated utilities change their rates, they need to provide evidence of changes in cost to receive an approval. SCE and SDG&E have di↵erent rates because they have di↵erent 8 In summer billing months, both SCE and SDG&E customers in this area receive 10.2 kWh per day for their baseline. In winter billing months, the baseline is 10.1 kWh per day for SCE customers and 10.8 kWh per day for SDG&E customers. In the billing data, the monthly bills and price variables are calculated based on the exact baseline of each individual bill.
9 By August of 2000, wholesale electricity prices had more than tripled from the end of 1999, which caused large-scale blackouts, price spikes in retail electricity rates, financial losses to electric utilities in California. Many cost factors and demand shocks contributed to this rise, but several studies have also found the market power of suppliers to be significant throughout this period. See Joskow (2001) , Borenstein, Bushnell, and Wolak (2002) , Bushnell and Mansur (2005) , Puller (2007) , and Reiss and White (2008) for more details.
sources of electricity generation. Changes in input costs thus a↵ect their total costs di↵er-ently. They also have di↵erent cost structures for distributing electricity because they cover quite di↵erent service areas in California (Figure A.1). Finally, they had di↵erent sunk losses from the 2000-2001 California electricity crisis, required to be collected from ratepayers.
The price variation provides two advantages compared with previous studies. First, the magnitude of the variation is substantial. Cross-sectionally, households have significantly di↵erent nonlinear pricing and the variation changes over time substantially. Second, the di↵erence in marginal price between SCE and SDG&E is often significantly di↵erent from the di↵erence in average price between SCE and SDG&E. For example, consider consumers in the fourth tier in Figure 3 . While the marginal price is higher for SCE customers, the average price is higher for SDG&E customers. This price variation is key to distinguish the response to alternative forms of price in my estimation.
Data and Summary Statistics
Under a confidentiality agreement, SCE and SDG&E provided the household-level billing history of essentially all residential customers from 1999 to 2007. Each monthly record includes a customer's account ID, premise ID, billing start and end date, monthly consumption, monthly bill, tari↵ type, climate zone, and nine-digit zip code. It does not include a customer's name, address, and demographic information. To obtain demographic information, I match each customer's nine-digit zip code to a census block group in the 2000 U.S. Census.
In my sample, the mean number of households in a nine-digit zip code area is 4.9 and that in a census block group is 217.3. The nine-digit zip code thus allows precise neighborhood matching with census data.
My empirical analysis uses the samples that satisfy the following criteria. First, I focus on customers that are on the default standard tari↵.
10 Second, I focus on the six cities that have 10 Over 85% of households are on the standard tari↵. About 15% of households are on the California Alternative Rate for Energy (CARE) program, a means-tested tari↵ for low-income households. About 5% of households have other tari↵s such as time-of-use pricing.
11 I show that using unbalanced panel of all households does not change my results.
Empirical Analysis and Results

Bunching at Kink Points of Price Schedules
My first empirical strategy is to examine bunching of consumers at the kink points of nonlinear price schedules (Heckman 1983; Saez 2010; Chetty et al. 2011 ). In Figure 1 , suppose that preferences for electricity consumption are convex and smoothly distributed across the kink point k. Then, if consumers respond to the true marginal price p(x), a disproportionate share of demand curves intersect with the vertical part of the schedule. I thus expect a disproportionate share of consumers bunching around the kink point in the data. The amount of bunching should be larger when 1) the discrete jump in marginal price at k is large and 2) the price elasticity of demand is large.
Bunching Analysis Results. In 1999, consumers faced an essentially flat marginal rate with a small step between the first and second tier. Therefore, the distribution of consumption there is no bunching even at the second kink, where the marginal price discontinuously increases more than 80%. I find no bunching for any year of the data in SCE and SDG&E. 
Encompassing Tests of Alternative Prices
My second empirical strategy is to test whether consumers respond to marginal, expected marginal, or average price by using the encompassing test (Davidson and MacKinnon 1993) . Let x it denote consumer i's average daily electricity use during billing month t. Suppose that they have quasi-linear utility for electricity consumption. 13 I allow the possibility that they may respond to marginal price or average price by characterizing their demand by
it with the price elasticity with respect to marginal price (-1 ) and average price (-2 ). Define -lnx it = lnx it ≠lnx it 0 in which t 0 is the previous year's same billing month.
This first-di↵erence eliminates household-by-month fixed e↵ects. Consider the estimating equation:
with city-by-time fixed e↵ects " ct and error term A common identification problem of nonlinear pricing is that the price variables are functions of consumption and hence correlated with unobserved demand shocks ÷ it . To address the endogeneity, previous studies use a policy-induced price change as an instrument:
. This instrument, also called a simulated instrument, computes the predicted price change at a consumption levelx it . The instrument thus captures the price change induced by the policy change in the nonlinear price schedule for a consumption levelx it . To be a valid instrument,x it has to be uncorrelated with ÷ it . Many studies use the base year's consumption x it 0 forx it . However, x it 0 is likely to be correlated with ÷ it because the mean reversion of consumption creates a negative correlation between Blomquist and Selin (2010) and Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz (2012) suggest that consumption in a period midway between t 0 and t can be used to address the in electricity consumption over time, I cannot expect a parallel trend between high and low electricity users. This is exactly the same problem long discussed in the literature of nonlinear taxation (Heckman 1996; Blundell, Duncan, and Meghir 1998; Goolsbee 2000; Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz 2012) . A usual quasi-experiment essentially compares the change in income between lower and higher income households. Because all comparable households usually face the same nonlinear tax schedule, there is no clean control group that can be used to control for di↵erential underlying growth between lower and higher income households.
To address the problem, I exploit the spatial discontinuity in electricity service areas.
Because households in the same city experience di↵erent nonlinear pricing, I can use households on the other side of the border as a control group. My identification assumption is that confounding factors such as underlying distributional changes in consumption are not systematically di↵erent across the border. Consider the instrumental variable (IV) regression:
with instruments, - To control for the e↵ect, I include billing-cycle-by-time fixed e↵ects " bt .
Encompassing Tests Results: Figure 6 provides a graphical illustration of the encompassing test. To show an example of year-to-year price variation, the figure uses January billing months and households whose x itm is on the forth tier of the five-tier price schedule. 15 The squared-dashed line shows the di↵erence-in-di↵erences (DD) in the mean of log marginal price (lnmp it ) for SDG&E customers relative to SCE customers. For each customer, I calculate the change in log marginal price from 1999. Then, I obtain the DD by subtracting SCE's mean from SDG&E's mean. The DD estimate thus shows how SDG&E's marginal price evolved from 1999 relative to SCE. I call it the relative change in marginal price. In the same way, I calculate the DD in the means of predicted log marginal price (lnmp P I it ), log average price (lnap it ), predicated log average price (lnap P I it ), and log consumption (lnx it ). However, the figure shows the opposite result: SDG&E's consumption decreases more than SCE's consumption. Unless the price elasticity is positive, the relative change in consumption is inconsistent with the relative change in marginal price. Rather, it is more consistent with the relative change in average price, although formal econometric estimation is required to discuss its statistical inference. Now, I run the instrumental variable estimation in equation (3) by using all monthly billing data from January 1999 to December 2007. Table 2 presents the regression results that examine whether consumers respond to marginal or average price. I cluster the standard errors at the household level to correct for serial correlation. First, I include only the marginal price of electricity as a price variable. Column 1 shows that the price elasticity with respect to marginal price is -0.040. This result contradicts the result in the bunching analysis, where I find nearly zero price elasticity with respect to marginal price. However, the encompassing test in column 3 implies that the significant price elasticity in column 1 comes from spurious correlation. Column 3 includes both marginal and average price as price variables. If consumers respond to marginal price as the standard theory predicts, I
expect that average price does not a↵ect demand conditional on the e↵ect of marginal price.
Column 3 reveals the opposite result. Once average price is included, adding marginal price does not statistically change the e↵ect of average price. Moreover, the e↵ect of marginal price becomes statistically insignificant from zero.
Because households receive electricity bills at the end of monthly billing periods, they may respond to lagged price rather than contemporaneous price. Column 4 to 6 provide the results with one-month lagged price. Using lagged price does not change the main result. Households respond to lagged average price rather than lagged marginal price. The price elasticity with respect to lagged price is larger than the elasticity with respect to contemporaneous price, suggesting the possibility that consumers respond to lagged price more than contemporaneous price. Table 2 investigates this point. Column 1 shows that consumers respond to lagged prices and the e↵ect of contemporaneous price is statistically insignificant from zero once the e↵ects of lagged prices are controlled. Usually, the most policy-relevant price elasticity is the medium-long run elasticity that includes these lagged responses. Column 2 to 4 include the average of one, two, three, and four-month lagged average prices. The estimated elasticity thus shows the percent change in consumption when consumers experience a persistent change in average price for one to four-month period. The medium-long run price elasticity estimates are larger than the short-run elasticity estimate.
I find that lagged prices with more than four-month lags have negligible e↵ects and the medium-long run elasticity estimates do not change when I include more than four-month lags.
Next, I examine the possibility that consumers respond to expected marginal price. To find the degree of uncertainty that typical consumers face in their monthly consumption, I
estimate the variance of lnx it conditional on household-by-month fixed e↵ects and one-month lagged log consumption. The median of the root mean squared error is about 0.2, suggesting that with this information the average consumer can predict his consumption with a standard error of about 20%. Based on this estimate, I calculate expected marginal price by assuming that consumers have errors with a standard deviation of 20% of their consumption. Table   4 shows evidence that consumers respond to average price rather than expected marginal price. Column 3 shows that once average price is included, adding expected marginal price does not statistically change the e↵ect of average price. Column 4 to 6 show that using lagged price does not change the result.
The results in this section provide evidence that households respond to average price among the three prices predicted by theory. The online appendix shows that the results are robust for 1) unbalanced panel data that include all households in my sample period, 2) the samples restricted to households within a certain distance from the border, and 3) alternative instruments. The encompassing test is simple and su cient for testing competing theoretical predictions. However, it cannot completely eliminate other possibilities of the perceived price. For example, the previous analysis assumes that the average consumer can predict his consumption with a standard error of about 20%. If households have more or less information about their expected consumption, their expected marginal price can be di↵erent from the assumed expected marginal price. To address this point, the next section uses an approach that examines a general form of the perceived price instead of starting with a particular prediction of perceived price.
Estimation of the Shape of Perceived Price
In the previous two sections, I begin with the particular forms of perceived price derived from the theoretical predictions and examine which of the competing forms of the perceived price is the most consistent with the data. I take a di↵erent approach in this section. Consider that consumers have consumption x it and face a nonlinear price schedule p(x it ). I define a series of surrounding consumption levels around
is the level of consumption that is k% away from 
This density 
This estimation is nonlinear only in parameters and linear in variables. I can thus run nonlinear IV estimation without having additional identifying assumptions than the linear IV estimation in the previous section (Amemiya, 1983) . 16 For the endogenous variable -lnp k,it , I use the same form of the instrument used in the previous section, - Elasticity parameter -is the overall price elasticity and -· w k (-, ◊) shows the price elasticity with respect to the change in each of p k,it .
Perceived Price Estimation Results. Table 5 Figure   7 plots the estimated weighting function. The shape is close to a uniform distribution and it is statistically not di↵erent from a uniform distribution,
. Column 2 and 3 present similar findings for one-month lag price and the average of four-month lag prices.
The results provide several implications. First, the estimates of -imply that consumers are unlikely to respond to expected marginal price. Second, the estimated shape of the weighing function is consistent with the results in the previous section, and both strategies find that consumers respond to average price rather than marginal or expected marginal price. The next section examines the welfare and policy implications of this finding.
5 Welfare Analysis
Nonlinear Pricing and Energy Conservation
Many electric, natural gas, and water utilities in the US adopted nonlinear pricing similar to California's residential electricity pricing. Policy makers often claim that higher marginal prices for excessive consumption can create an incentive for conservation. Note that the retail price of utility companies is usually regulated and has a zero profit condition with a rate of return. When utility companies switch from a flat marginal rate to multi-tier pricing, they need to lower the marginal price for some tiers to raise the marginal price for other tiers. The e↵ect on aggregate consumption is thus ambiguous because some customers see an increase in price while others see a decrease in price. I use the data in my sample to examine how nonlinear pricing changes consumption compared to a counterfactual flat marginal rate for two scenarios: 1) customers respond to average price and 2) they respond to marginal price. 
-by assuming that consumers respond to marginal price with price elasticity -when they correctly perceive their true marginal price.
17
When aggregate consumption changes in the counterfactual scenarios, the total revenue and cost also change. To keep total consumption comparable between the observed and two counterfactual cases, I assume that the utility company maintains a profit neutrality condition by adjusting the tari↵ in the following way. First, I assume that the long-run marginal cost equals the average cost of electricity under the existing nonlinear tari↵. For example, for SCE's tari↵ in 2007, the marginal cost based on this assumption equals 16.73¢/kWh.
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Then, the alternative flat marginal rate tari↵ is simply a marginal rate of 16.73¢/kWh, which produces the same profit as the existing five-tier tari↵. Second, I assume that the company adjusts each of the five tier rate by the same proportion to keep the profit neutrality when aggregate consumption changes. five-tier tari↵. I compute counterfactual consumption using the medium-long run price elasticity estimate -0.101. The aggregate consumption increases by 0.28% if consumers respond to average price. The intuition behind this result is the following. When the price schedule is switched from a flat marginal rate to nonlinear pricing, lower electricity users increase their consumption because they face lower price. Higher electricity users decrease consumption but only slightly because their average price does not increase much. In contrast, the marginal price increases substantially. This is why the aggregate consumption decreases by 2.71% if consumers respond to marginal price. The results suggest that the nonlinear pricing would be e↵ective in reducing aggregate consumption if consumers respond to marginal price.
However, if consumers respond to average price, it does not reduce aggregate consumption compared with the counterfactual flat marginal rate pricing.
E ciency Costs of Nonlinear Pricing
Multi-tier electricity pricing creates e ciency costs because it does not reflect the marginal cost of electricity (Faruqui 2008) . 20 The marginal cost of electricity generally depends on the timing of consumption. However, there is no evidence that the marginal cost depends on the level of a customer's monthly consumption. Among time-invariant electricity pricing, the most e cient pricing is therefore likely to be the flat marginal rate that equals the marginal cost of electricity. 21 In multi-tier pricing, the marginal prices for lower tiers are too low and those for higher tiers are too high compared to the e cient flat marginal rate. The deadweight loss of price schedule p(x) for a consumer whose consumption equals x ú can be calculated by the integral between the e cient price and the price schedule, dwl(p(x)) =´x This is because the optimal consumption level in the presence of the negative externalities becomes closer to the quantity obtained with the marginal price response. The welfare impact of the sub-optimizing behavior in the case of electricity consumption thus depends on the social marginal cost of electricity. This result is contrast to the welfare implication for the labor supply response to a nonlinear income tax schedule (Liebman and Zeckhauser, 2004) , where the sub-optimal response always produces smaller deadweight loss because workers are less discouraged to work when they misperceive their average tax rate as the true rate.
Conclusion and Discussion
This paper exploits price variation at spatial discontinuities in California electricity service areas to examine whether consumers respond to marginal price or alternative forms of price in response to nonlinear pricing. The evidence strongly suggests that consumers respond to average price and do not respond to marginal or expected marginal price. I show that this sub-optimizing behavior makes nonlinear pricing unsuccessful in achieving its policy goal of energy conservation and substantially changes the e ciency cost of nonlinear pricing.
Why do consumers respond to average price rather than marginal price? Given the information available to most residential electricity customers in my sample period, the information cost of understanding the marginal price of electricity is likely to be substantial.
First, monthly utility bills are often complex and make it harder for consumers to understand the nonlinear structure of their pricing. Second, it is di cult for most consumers to monitor cumulative electricity consumption during a billing month without having an in-home display that provides the information about their consumption. In contrast, such information is not show the mean and standard error for SCE customers and SDG&E customers in the six cities that have the territory border of SCE and SDG&E within the city limits. The last column shows the di↵erence in the mean with the standard error of the di↵erence. I cluster standard errors at the census block group level for the Census data and at the customer level for the electricity billing data. *, **, and *** show 10%, 5%, and 1% statistical significance. (3) with fixed e↵ects and control variables specified in the equation. The unit of observation is household-level monthly electricity bill. The dependent variable is the log change in electricity consumption in billing period t from billing period t ≠ 12. The sample period is from January 1999 to December 2007 and the sample size is 3,712,704 for columns 1 to 3 and 3,674,030 for columns 4 to 6. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the household level to adjust for serial correlation. 
Medium-Long Run Reponses
Notes: See notes in Table 3 . The dependent variable is the log change in electricity consumption in billing period t from billing period t ≠ 12. Because the four-month lag price is unknown for the first four months of the sample period, I include monthly bills from May 1999 to December 2007 and the sample size is 3,558,008. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the household level to adjust for serial correlation. Table 3 . This table shows the results of the nonlinear IV regression in equation (5). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the household level to adjust for serial correlation. Column 1 uses the contemporaneous price, column 2 uses the one-month lagged price, and column 3 uses the average of one, two, three, and four-month lagged prices as a price variable in the regression. Notes: This table shows the results of the IV regression in equation (3) with fixed e↵ects and control variables specified in the equation for di↵erent samples and alternative instruments. See notes in Table 3 . Column 1 shows the main result that is presented in Table 3 . Column 2 uses unbalanced panel data that include all households who open and close their electricity account during my sample period, from January 1999 to December 2007. Column 3 uses alternative instrument. I calculate the mean consumption in 1999 for each customer. Then, I calculate the policy-induced price change by using this value. Column 4 and 5 limit my sample to households within a certain distance from the territory border of SCE and SDG&E. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the household level to adjust for serial correlation.
